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2.a Occurrence Reporting and Investigation Procedures

Revision: 4
Date: 05 September 2024

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Page	Date	Comment
26	05 September 2024	2a.7.6 Build-up issues, updated.

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Term	Definition
Airside	The non-public and within the secured area of an airport, directly involved in the arrival and departure of aircraft.
Aircraft damage	An aircraft sustains damage or structural failure that adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the aircraft and would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component.
AOG	Aircraft on Ground, aircraft damage that requires the aircraft to be grounded until assessment and/or repair is completed.
Accident	An occurrence in which: a) a person is fatally or seriously injured, b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure, or c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.
Anonymous reporting	A reporting system that protects the identity of the reporter and includes the possibility that reports may be submitted anonymously.
Confidential reporting	The reporter's identity is not passed on to other parties and the reporter is not revealed before being made public or distributed.
Contributing factors	Actions, omissions, events, conditions, or a combination thereof, which, if eliminated, avoided or absent, would have reduced the probability of the accident or incident occurring, or mitigated the severity of the consequences of the accident or incident.
Corrective action	Process, or a series of actions, designated to minimise or eliminate the likelihood that a nonconformance (event, process or system that does not meet a requirement or standard), defect, or problem will reoccur, or happen again.
Corrective action plan	Planned corrective action, i.e. a description of the changes planned to correct root causes or contributing factors.
Hazard	A condition or an object with the potential to cause or contribute to an aircraft incident or accident.
Incident	An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of operation.
Investigation	A process conducted for the purpose of accident / incident prevention which includes the gathering and analysis of information, the drawing of conclusions, including the determination of causes and / or contributing factors and, when appropriate, the making of safety recommendations.
Just culture	Is a culture in which front-line operators and others are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them which commensurate with their experience and training, but where gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated.
Load errors	The difference between the reported and actual loaded state of the aircraft (note: reported means documented in the load plan (LIR)).
Occurrence	A term used by ICAO to denote either an accident or incident.
Proactive risk management	To do something before an accident happens by utilising any and all available data and intelligence to identify risks from past accidents or incidents.
Reactive risk management	To do something to address the risks identified in an accident or incident after it has occurred.

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Risk assessment	Is an evaluation based on engineering and operational judgment and / or analysis methods in order to establish whether the achieved or perceived risk is acceptable or tolerable.
Risk mitigation	The process of incorporating defences or preventive controls to lower the severity and / or likelihood of a hazard's projected consequence.
Root cause	The original event(s), action(s), and / or condition(s) generating (directly or in cascade) an actual or potential undesirable condition, situation, nonconformity or failure. There are often several root causes for one problem.
Root cause analysis	An in-depth process or technique to identify the most basic factor(s) which cause a variation in the performance (problem).
Safety	The state in which risks associated with aviation activities, related to, or in direct support of the operation of aircraft, are reduced and controlled to an acceptable level.
Safety concern	A condition or situation that could potentially affect safety.
Safety culture	Normal or everyday workplace behaviours, often characterised as "the way we do things around here".
Safety Management System	A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organisational structures, accountability, responsibilities, policies and procedures.
Safety policy	A statement of the organisation's fundamental approach to achieve acceptable level of safety.
Safety recognition	Recognition for staff that demonstrated safe behaviours.
Safety risk	The predicted probability and severity of the consequences or outcomes of a hazard.
Safety risk probability	Likelihood that a safety consequence or outcome might occur.
Safety risk severity	The extent of harm that might reasonably occur as a consequence or outcome of the identified hazard taking into account the worst foreseeable situation.
Safety risk mitigation / Control measures	Tools to reduce the probability of an occurrence, or the severity of the consequences, or both.

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Acronym	Definition
CAA	Civil Aviation Authority
CAPA	Corrective and Preventive Action
DG	Dangerous Goods
DHL AGOM	DHL Airside Ground Operations Manual
GSE	Ground Service Equipment
GSP	Ground Service Provider
GTW	Gateway
HUB	DHL Hub
ICARE	DHL's OHS Incident Management Tool
IQSMS	DHL's Airside Incident Management Tool
MOR	Mandatory Occurrence Report
OHS	Occupational Health and Safety
RCG	Restricted Commodities Group
RCIR	Restricted Commodities Incident Report
SMS	Safety Management System
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
ULD	Unit Load Device

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2a.1 General

Safety, Security and Quality are fundamental operational priorities at all times within DHL Express. One of DHL Express' objectives is to have a proactive approach to managing safety within the organisation and to promote an open and just safety culture which allows each employee to report Accidents, Incidents and Safety Concerns. For this purpose, Global Airside & Standards (referred to as Global Airside throughout this document) has introduced the IQSMS application globally as main reporting and investigation platform for all airside-related occurrences and issues that fall under the scope of its Safety Management System (SMS). The SMS scope, as outlined in **2. Global Airside Safety Management System (SMS)**, includes all airside-related activities AND events that happen outside of the airside environment BUT have (or credibly could have) an impact on airside activities and ultimately flight safety.

2a.1.1 Responsibility

Global Airside & Standards – Process Owner

For any questions in regard to the processes described in this document please reach out to:

globalairside.safety@dhl.com

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2a.2 Reporting

2a.2.1 Report Types

All airside safety-related events shall be reported and respective data captured in DHL Express' corporate reporting system IQSMS irrespective of an effective impact or the severity of the occurrence. Three kinds of reports are available:

- Occurrence Report
- Safety Concern
- Safety Recognition



The reporting and follow-up processes detailed in this document are equally applicable to all report types (i.e. Occurrence Report, Safety Concern Report, Safety Recognition Report).

2a.2.1.1 Occurrence Report

Occurrence reporting refers to the reporting of Accidents and Incidents. For ease of reference, Accidents and Incidents will therefore be referred to as "Occurrences" throughout this document. The Occurrence Report within IQSMS is to be used for documenting all Accidents and Incidents, including procedure non-compliances, within the airside operations. That means, the Occurrence Report is to be used after something actually happened and/or procedures were not followed.

Example: The cones around the aircraft were missing (procedure non-compliance).

2a.2.1.2 Safety Concern Report

The Safety Concern reporting form is to be used to report any safety concern that a member of staff might have. That means, nothing has actually happened, but there is a condition or situation that could potentially affect safety. Staff members are encouraged to proactively report anything that does not seem quite right; according to the saying, there are no stupid reports, if in doubt, report it. This includes, for instance, general hazards (any object or condition with the potential to cause harm) or near misses (an unplanned event where something almost happened, but was stopped before the event could materialize). Safety Concern reports are a means of proactive safety management.

Example: GSE was about to position at the aircraft while the cones were not in place yet. The TRC noticed this, stopped the GSE operators, and made sure the cones are being place before the operation continued.

2a.2.1.3 Safety Recognition Report

The Safety Recognition report is to be used to recognise members of staff for demonstrated safe behaviour. It is to be used where somebody or a group of people identified a potential safety issue and proactively took measures to rectify the situation, or where somebody went above his/her/their means to contribute to safety in a way that was not part of their normal job/task. Safety Recognition reports are used to reward positive behaviours and also a means of proactive safety management.

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Example: A member of staff noticed that there are regularly issues with the cones not being in place around the aircraft. He went ahead and developed a new aircraft arrival checklist, which was then implemented by his management for all turnarounds.

2a.2.2 Reporting Tools and Times

2a.2.2.1 IQSMS Web Portal

Reports can be made via the IQSMS web portal which is available for all internal employees under:

https://dga.asqs.net

Once the Kind of Report has been selected, the reporter shall select the Area of Occurrence, the Type of Occurrence, and the Event Classification. Based on the selection, the applicable reporting form will automatically be displayed.



Mandatory fields are highlighted by an asterisk (*) within each reporting form. It is important to fill in all mandatory fields as accurate as possible. Any evidence (e.g. pictures, documents) available at the time of reporting shall be attached to the report.

2a.2.2.2 IQSMS APP

Reports can also be made via the IQSMS Reporting APP available in the APP Store.



2a.2.2.3 Reporting via Station Management

Front line employees, who do not have access to a computer or the Reporting APP, and IQSMS respectively, might use alternative reporting means which shall be defined and implemented locally by the station management. In such cases, the reports shall ultimately be captured and validated in IQSMS by the responsible supervisor, line or duty manager.

2a.2.2.4 Third Party Reporting

Airside-related reports captured in an airline's reporting system shall also be captured in IQSMS. For internal airlines, it is the responsibility of the airline's Post Holder for Safety that these reports are entered into IQSMS. For external airlines, it is the responsibility of the Regional Airside Team to capture the reports in IQSMS.

Similarly, airside-related reports made by any other party (e.g. Ground Service Provider (GSP), airport authority) shall also be entered into IQSMS. It is the responsibility of the Regional Airside Team to follow up with the station of

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occurrence and to ensure that a report is created in IQSMS by the local DHL staff.

2a.2.2.5 Reporting Time Lines

Reports shall be raised per Occurrence or Safety Concern. That means, for instance, if several non-conformities are observed during one turnaround, multiple Occurrence Reports shall be made in IQSMS, one for each Occurrence or Non-Conformity. Any Occurrence or Safety Concern Report must be submitted within maximum 24 hours of occurrence / observation. Safety Recognition Reports can be made at any time.

2a.2.3 Data Protection

The reporting, notification and investigation of reports in IQSMS shall be carried out in a way that preserves the privacy and medical confidentiality of all employees, contractors and of the public, ensuring compliance with DHL's Code of Conduct Policy and local laws. The following information shall not be included in announcements and subsequent investigation reports, except when legally required:

- Name, job titles, and other personally identifiable information,
- Personal medical information,
- People shall not be recognised in pictures or images.

Any data collected shall not be used for any purpose other than the improvement of safety and the SMS.

All information in IQSMS is classified as confidential information. Data captured in IQSMS shall not be further distributed or shared with any party that is not part of an investigation.

2a.2.3.1 Confidentiality

To ensure confidentiality of reports, the name of the reporter will only be visible to the Global Airside Safety Department (i.e. System Administrators). Nobody else involved in an investigation or with read access to the IQSMS database on a regional or station level will be able to identify the names of persons reporting.



2a.2.3.2 Anonymous Reporting

It is also possible to submit a report completely anonymous in IQSMS by selecting "anonymous" in the Reporter field. If anonymous is selected, nobody, including the Global Airside System Administrators, will be able to see the name of the reporter.



However, the Global Airside Safety Department will still be able to contact the reporter via an anonymous email mechanism within IQSMS in case any additional information is required. That means, the Global Airside System Administrator will be able to send an email via the IQSMS application to "anonymous" without being able to see the name of the person reporting.

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2a.3 Description of Sequence

The following section outlines the process of report Validation, Root Cause Analysis, Corrective Action(s) and Closure. As mentioned before, the sequence is applicable to all report types.

2a.3.1 Report Validation

Once a report has been entered into IQSMS, its status appears as “Validation” in the database.

All reports are processed by the Global Airside Safety Department. As a first step, the Global Airside System Administrator shall review the report and check that all fields have been completed correctly (i.e. sense-checking).

If the information is incomplete, the Global Airside System Administrator shall complete the missing fields (if the details are available from internal systems), or contact the reporter via the “Mail to Reporter” option to gather any missing information.

Once all information is complete, the Global Airside System Administrator shall approve the report.

Under specific circumstances, it is possible to reject a report. These include:

- Duplicate reports (i.e. double entries with identical information),
- When a report that was raised by mistake and the reporter has asked to delete the report.

The status of any rejected report will show as “Deleted” in IQSMS. However, these reports are still archived in the database and can be used for trend monitoring. The reason for rejecting a report shall be documented by the Regional Airside System Administrator.

Reports shall be validated and accepted or rejected by the Global Airside System Administrator within 3 days after a report has been raised.

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2a.3.2 Initial Safety Risk Assessment

Once all information has been sense-checked and the report approved, an initial safety risk assessment shall be performed by the Global Airside System Administrator.

For actual Occurrences, any safety risk assessment shall be based on the “real scenario”, that means the actual impact or outcome of the Occurrence is assessed. Occasionally, in addition to the “real scenario” the “worst credible scenario” can be assessed. The decision whether it makes sense to assess both scenarios is taken by the Global Airside System Administrator.

Risk assessments for Safety Concern Reports shall be made based on the “worst credible scenario”, i.e. what is the worst case that could credibly happen.

Safety Recognition Reports that do not involve a hazard and associated risk can be classified as “no risk involved”, if applicable. Safety Recognition reports that refer to an underlying Occurrence / Safety Concern will be risk assessed as described above.

Every risk assessment consists of a number of steps:

- Hazard identification
- Definition of consequences associated to the hazard
- Safety risk probability assessment
- Safety risk severity assessment
- Definition of safety risk index

Any risk assessment shall be conducted using the matrix shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Safety Risk Matrix

Severity						
Catastrophic	5	5 Medium	10 High	15 High	20 Severe	25 Severe
Hazardous	4	4 Low	8 Medium	12 High	16 High	20 Severe
Major	3	3 Low	6 Medium	9 Medium	12 High	15 High
Minor	2	2 Low	4 Low	6 Medium	8 Medium	10 High
Negligible	1	1 Low	2 Low	3 Low	4 Low	5 Medium
		Extremely Improbable Has not occurred in the industry 1	Improbable Has not occurred within DHL, but in the industry 2	Remote Unlikely, but may occur (yearly) 3	Occasional Likely to occur sometimes (monthly) 4	Frequent Likely to occur many times (daily) 5
		Likelihood				

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2a.3.2.1 Hazard Identification

A hazard is a condition or an object with the potential to cause harm. In aviation this refers to those conditions or objects that have the potential to cause death, injury to personnel, damage to equipment or structure, loss of material, or the reduction of the ability to perform a prescribed function. Therefore, as a first step the hazard(s) associated to each Occurrence or Safety Concern must be identified.
Considering the following scenarios:

I. Occurrence Report example (actual occurrence): Positioning of stairs without extending the safety rails. No impact on safety. The hazard in this scenario is fall from height.
II. Safety Concern Report example (worst credible scenario): A member of staff intended to approach the aircraft with engines running and the anti-collision beacon on, but was stopped before he entered the circle of safety. The hazard in this scenario is ingestion into the still running engine.

2a.3.2.2 Definition of Consequences Associated to the Hazard

Subsequently, the impact or outcome of the hazard needs to be identified. For Occurrences, this is the actual impact or outcome of the Occurrence. For Safety Concerns, this is the consequence(s) of the hazard(s) in the worst credible situation.

Continuing the examples from above:

I. Occurrence Report example (actual occurrence): There was no actual safety impact or outcome from positioning the stairs without extending the safety rails.
II. Safety Concern Report example (worst credible scenario): The worst credible consequence from a member of staff approaching the aircraft with engines running is death due to engine ingestion.

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2a.3.2.3 Safety Risk Probability Assessment

Next is an assessment of the probability of occurrence. For Occurrences this means, how often the Occurrence has happened at a particular station in the past. It is the responsibility of the Global Airside System Administrator to review historic data and to identify the number of repetitive events of the same nature.

For Safety Concern Reports, it is the likelihood that a safety consequence or outcome might occur. Table 2 shows DHL Express' safety risk probability scale, a five point scale assigning a numerical value to each category ("Extremely Improbable" (1) to "Frequent" (5)).

Likelihood level	Occurrences at a station level			Meaning
	Upper boundary	Mean	Lower boundary	
Frequent (5)	Always	1 per day	1 per week	Likely to occur many times at a station
Occasional (4)	1 per week	1 per month	2 per year	Likely to occur sometimes at a station
Remote (3)	2 per year	1 per year	every 3 years	Unlikely, but may possibly occur at a station
Improbable (2)	Has not occurred within DHL, but recently in the aviation industry			Very unlikely to occur at a station
Extremely improbable (1)	Has not occurred recently in the aviation industry			Almost inconceivable that the even will ever occur

Continuing the examples from above:

I. Occurrence Report example (actual occurrence): The probability of positioning the stairs without extending the safety rails is "Occasional" (4). That means it happens on a regular basis, but not daily.
II. Safety Concern Report example (worst credible scenario): The probability of death due to engine ingestion is "Improbable" (2), which means that this event has occurred in the industry.

2a.3.2.4 Safety Risk Severity Assessment

Once the probability assessment has been completed, the next step is to assess the severity. For Occurrences, this is based on the actual impact or outcome of the Occurrence. For Safety Concern Reports, the severity of the consequence of the hazard in the worst credible situation is to be assessed.

Table 3 shows DHL Express' severity assessment. It includes five categories to denote the level of severity, the description of each category, and the assignment of a numerical value for each category ("Negligible" (1) to "Catastrophic" (5)). Examples for various occurrence types are given.

Where multiple hazards are determined, the highest individual score dictates the overall severity of the report.

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Table 3 Safety Risk Severity Levels

Level	1	2	3	4	5
Descriptor	Negligible	Minor	Major	Hazardous	Catastrophic
Safety	Operational safety not affected	Potential impact on operational safety	Significant reduction in safety margins potentially. Emergency procedures applied	Large reduction in safety margins with the potential for serious or fatal injury to people	Complete depletion of safety margins
Injury	No or negligible injuries (first aid treatment)	Minor Injuries requiring medical treatment	Serious injuries but nonpermanent health impairment	Fatalities and/or permanent disabilities, serious illness or health impairment	Multiple fatalities and/or permanent disabilities, serious illness or health impairments
Aircraft Damage Financial Impact	Negligible aircraft or system damage (< 300 EUR)	Minor aircraft or system damage (300 EUR to 10.000 EUR)	Substantial damage to aircraft or systems (10.000 EUR to 400.000 EUR)	Significant damage to aircraft or systems (400.000 EUR to 20 Mio EUR)	Total aircraft or system loss (>20 Mio EUR)
Aircraft Damage Technical Impact	No Aircraft delay or delay less than 15 Minutes	Aircraft grounded up to 48 hours	Aircraft grounded for more than 2 days	25% of Aircraft Fleet grounded for more than 2 days	Fleet grounded
Operational	No impact	1 flight rescheduled or delayed	Between 1 and 5 flights cancelled, rescheduled or delayed	Between 6 and 20 flights cancelled, rescheduled or delayed	More than 20 flights cancelled, rescheduled or delayed
Loading Error	Within LMC limits	LMC limits exceeded but aircraft in trim	Aircraft out of trim, no impact on flight safety	Aircraft out of trim, impact on flight safety (e.g. aircraft damaged / injury)	Aircraft destroyed and / or fatality
Damage to Asset	No repair required	Minor damage, repair carried out in the next planned MX cycle	Damage to asset, repair <1 day (asset operative until repair)	Damage to asset, repair > 1 week	No repair possible, asset has to be replaced
Organisational	No impact	Potential organisational slowdown and/or downtime	Minor organisational slowdown and/or minor downtime	Major slowdown and / or major downtime	Shutdown of organisation
Environmental	Spillage 100% contained, no pollution	Low impact on direct adjacent area of the working surface	Issue contained but light polluting impact	Major harmful pollution	Huge impact on land / ground / water, explosion
Reputation	Little or no public / local interest	Minor public / local interest	Reputation adversely affected with a small number of affected people	Significant public / local interest	Reputation impacted with some stakeholders
Compliance	Some single steps of documented process not implemented / documented	Contiguous steps of documented process not followed implemented / Documented. Process partly unclear	Majority of steps of documented process not implemented / documented or process unknown	Majority of steps of documented process not implemented / documented	Entirety of steps of documented process not implemented / documented or process non-existent
Loss of expertise	Loss not requiring renewal	Slight loss that can be absorbed within the existing organisation within 3 months	Loss requiring noticeable renewal (within 3-6 months)	Major loss requiring substantial renewal (within up to 1 year)	Significant loss requiring substantial renewal (within 1-2 years)

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Continuing the example from above:

I. Occurrence Report example (actual occurrence): There is no actual safety impact from positioning the stairs without extending the safety rails. Therefore, the severity of the actual occurrence is “Negligible” (1).
II. Safety Concern Report example (worst credible scenario): The severity of the consequence of the hazard (death due engine ingestion) in the worst credible situation is “Hazardous” (4).

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2a.3.2.5 Definition of Safety Risk Index

The safety risk probability and severity assessment process is subsequently used to derive a safety risk index. The safety risk indices are shown in the matrix presented in Table 1 (i.e. 1 to 25). The final resulting score defines one of four colour coded safety risk categories (shown below in Table 4). Based on this, safety risks are conceptually assessed as “Low”, “Medium”, “High”, and “Severe” and appropriate safety risk controls must be employed as follows:

Table 4 Safety Risk Category

Safety Risk Category	Action(s) to be taken
Severe	STOP the activity immediately (or must not start). Urgent action must be taken to reduce the risk to its lowest reasonably practicable level
High	The risk has to be reduced as safety is not fully ensured. Action shall be taken urgently to reduce the risk by one category minimum
Medium	Perform any action thought to be possible at local level where reasonable to move risk into green category
Low	No action required but facts must be recorded

The safety risk index and associated categories of the examples given before are:

I. Occurrence Report example (actual occurrence): The safety risk category of positioning the stairs without extending the safety rails is 4. The associated safety risk category is “Low”, meaning that no action is required, but facts must be recorded.
II. Safety Concern Report example (worst credible scenario): The safety risk category of approaching the aircraft with engines running is “Medium” (index: 8), meaning that any action thought to be possible at local level shall be conducted.

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2a.3.2.6 Actions to be taken based on Safety Risk Category

Based on the safety risk category the Global Airside System Administrator shall close each report on receipt or open it up for Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Action.

To prioritise certain Occurrence / Safety Concern types that have received attention within the organisation, DHL Express has formulated Business Rules detailing which reports shall always be opened up for Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Action. These can be found in section 7.

For scenarios that are not captured in the Business Rules, the following applies:

Table 5 Actions to be taken based on Safety Risk Category

Safety Risk Category	Action(s) to be taken
Severe	Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Action required
High	Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Action required
Medium	Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Action required
Low	Report to be closed upon receipt without investigation

2a.3.2.7 Escalation Procedure

No matter what the Occurrence or Safety Concern, repetitive reports of the same type and nature at the same location should be escalated in risk value and be followed-up once a trend is noticeable.

It is upon discretion of the Global Airside System Administrator to decide which reports will be escalated and opened up for further analysis. Similarly, the Regional Airside Teams can request to escalate reports for follow-up if a trend or concern has been identified.

The last report that has been received and based on which the decision for escalation has been made will be followed-up in IQSMS. The Global Airside System Administrator will add a note about the decision in the “Comment for Responsible” field.

All escalated reports will be classified as “Escalated” and will not be considered for the calculation of Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs).

2a.3.2.8 Requests from Airlines

The business rules outlined in this document stipulate the minimum requirements for report follow-up. Local airlines may impose stricter requirements. Therefore, airlines can request follow-up if this is required by their local authorities (i.e. follow-up required by Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) stipulations).

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2a.3.3 Report Closure upon Receipt

Any report showing a “Low” safety risk category will be closed upon receipt. After the report has been approved, the Global Airside System Administrator will assign an event classification from a predefined taxonomy. Subsequently, the report will be closed and its status will change to “Closed” within IQSMS. The reporter will receive an automatic email advising him/her/them of the report closure.

Exemptions to this rule are outlined in the business rules for specific occurrence types (see **2a.7 - Reporting and Follow-Up Business Rules for Specific Occurrence Types**) or detailed in the escalation procedure (see section **2a.3.2.7 - Escalation Procedure**).

Safety Recognition Reports where no risk was involved shall also be closed upon receipt.

Reports that are closed upon receipt are used for trend monitoring. The accountable station shall review all relevant Occurrences and Safety Concerns and perform any action reasonably practicable to prevent reoccurrence.

2a.3.4 Opening a Report for Follow-up

Any report that is not closed upon receipt will be subject to follow-up and opened up for Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Action. This is applicable to:

- Any Occurrence or Safety Concern with a “Medium”, “High” or “Severe” safety risk category
- Any Occurrence or Safety Concern that falls under the business rules for specific occurrence types outlined in section **2a.7 - Reporting and Follow-Up Business Rules for Specific Occurrence Types**
- Any escalated Occurrence / Safety Concern
- Any Safety Recognition Report that refers to an underlying Occurrence / Safety Concern with a “Medium”, “High” or “Severe” safety risk category

2a.3.4.1 Assignment of Responsibles

During the approval process, the Regional Airside System Administrator will assign one or more Responsible(s) to a report, who will be automatically notified by email that they have been assigned as Responsible(s). Any instruction to the Responsible(s), such as specific actions to be taken, will be entered in the “Comment for Responsible” field. Once a Responsible has been assigned, the status of the report changes to “In Progress”.

The assigned Responsible(s)(as shown in Table 6) is overall responsible to ensure the Root Cause Analysis (i.e. 5 WHY Analysis) and the Corrective Action(s) will be completed. All Corrective Actions must be supported by evidence of implementation, a corrective action plan alone is not sufficient for report closure. It is possible to reassign a report and to add more people, who will then also become Responsible(s).

Table 6 Overall Responsible(s) per Region

Region	Investigation Owner
Asia Pacific (AP)	AP Aviation Programs Team
Americas (AM)	Airside Area Managers AM Regional Airside
Europe (EU)	Airside Cluster Managers EU Regional Airside
Middle East & North Africa (MENA)	MENA Regional Airside / Network Support
Sub Saharan Africa (SSA)	SSA Regional Airside
Investigations whereby an airline is accountable	Regional Airside Team where the event occurred

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2a.3.4.2 Role of Regional Airside Teams

The Regional Airside Teams will be granted access to all reports that have been opened for Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Actions. It is the responsibility of the Regional Airside Teams to oversee any Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Actions in their respective regions and to provide guidance and support to the assigned Responsible(s). The Regional Airside Teams shall furthermore approve all corrective actions that have been taken by the Responsibles. In addition, it is the responsibility of the Regional Airside Teams to communicate on all reports and safety-matters to all relevant parties (e.g. stations, internal and external airlines, 3rd parties) within their respective regions.

In addition, the Regional Airside Teams shall act as Responsible(s) for any report where an airline has been identified as accountable.

2a.3.4.3 Evaluation of Corrective Actions

Once a Corrective Action has been submitted by the Responsible(s), they shall be approved by the Regional Airside Teams (by selecting “Approved by Region”). Afterwards, the Global Airside System Administrator will also review the Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Action(s) taken. Only reports that contain evidence of implementation will be approved for closure.

If the Root Cause Analysis and/or Corrective Action is deemed insufficient or inadequate, the Global Airside System Administrator will assign additional actions to the Responsible(s).

2a.3.4.4 Approval of Severe Safety Risks

If the initial safety risk assessment has identified the safety risk of the actual occurrence outcome as “Severe” (safety risk index >20), the Safety Risk Owner (e.g. airline, GSP) shall be informed about the results of the Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Action(s) and his/her/their approval shall be sought. It is the responsibility of the Global Airside System Administrator to seek approval from the Safety Risk Owner and to document it in IQSMS.

2a.3.4.5 Management with the Authority to make Decisions regarding Safety Risk Tolerability

Table 7 summarises the level of management that can make decisions for the different safety risk levels.

Table 7 Level of Management with the Authority to make decisions regarding Safety Risk Tolerability

Safety Risk Category	Action	Management Level
Severe	Urgent action must be taken to reduce the risk to its lowest risk practicable.	Safety Risk Owner (e.g. Airline / GSP)
High	Action shall be taken to reduce the risk by one category minimum.	Regional Airside / Regional DHL Express Management
Medium	Perform any action thought to be possible at a local level where practical to move risk into green.	Accountable Station
Low	No action required but facts must be recorded.	Accountable Station

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2a.3.4.6 Report Summary, Residual Risk Assessment and Classification

Once the Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Action(s) has been evaluated as sufficient, the Global Airside System Administrator shall:

- Provide a summary of conclusions and Corrective Action(s) taken
- Indicate whether follow-up or further analysis is required
- Conduct a residual risk assessment
- Assigned an event classification from a predefined taxonomy.

In line with the organisation's SMS policy not to blame or accuse without evidence, if the location of occurrence cannot be verified, the accountable station will be shown as "Undetermined".

2a.3.4.7 Investigation Closure

Once all steps have been completed, the Global Airside System Administrator shall close the report. The report status will change to "Closed" within IQSMS.

2a.3.4.8 Investigations without Merit

In case the Root Cause Analysis concluded that a report was made without merit, the Regional Airside System Administrator shall close the report, detailing the information gathered that shows the report has no merit and change the risk score ("no risk involved") and classification ("no event") accordingly.

2a.3.4.9 Feedback

Once a report has been closed within IQSMS, an automatic notification will be sent to:

- The Reporter
- Regional Airside Teams
- All Responsible(s)

It is the responsibility of the Regional Airside Representatives to provide feedback to all relevant parties within their respective region as well as external parties (e.g. airlines, GHSPs, etc).

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2a.3.4.10 Report Follow-up Responsibilities

Table 8 summarises the responsible parties per function.

	AP	AM	EU	MENA	SSA
1	Global Airside	Global Airside	Global Airside	Global Airside	Global Airside
2	AP Aviation Programs Team	AM Regional Airside / Area Airside Managers	EU Regional Airside Team / Airside Cluster Managers	MENA Regional Airside Team / Network Support	SSA Regional Airside Team
3	Nominated personnel from accountable station /party	Nominated personnel from accountable station / party	Nominated personnel from accountable station / party	Nominated personnel from accountable station / party	Nominated personnel from accountable station / party
4	Regional Airside Teams	Regional Airside Teams	Regional Airside Teams	Regional Airside Teams	Regional Airside Teams

Function 1 – Report Administration and Management
Function 2 – Overall Responsible(s) - responsible to oversee the report progress and to ensure the Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Actions are completed on time
Function 3 – Additional Responsible(s) – responsible to complete the Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Action(s) on a local level
Function 4 – Regional Oversight and Communication

2a.3.4.11 Report Follow-Up Timelines

Table 9 defines the timelines for report follow-up in IQSMS.

Table 9 Timelines

Investigation Stage	Available Time Frame (after a report has been raised)
Report validation and approval, initial risk assessment, assignment of Responsible(s)	Max. 3 days
Root Cause Analysis	Max. 24 days
Corrective Action Plan	Max. 24 days
Review, residual risk assessment, classification, report closure, publication of report / feedback	Max. 30 days

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2a.4 Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR)

It is the responsibility of the local station to advise MOR reportable events to the appropriate Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) within the region.

IQSMS supports the transition of reports directly from the system to the relevant authority participating in ECCAIRS2. To set up an electronic link to the ECCAIRS2 portal, please contact your Global Airside System Administrator. Once the link has been set-up, the station wishing to submit to ECCAIRS2 shall nominate a CAA Responsible who will be in charge of transmitting to the relevant authorities.

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2a.5 Disputes

Where the classification and/or risk index/category allocated by the Global Airside System Administrator is disputed by the Regional Airside Teams, this shall be discussed first between the Regional and Global Airside System Administrators / Safety Analysts.

Where agreement cannot be made, this will be escalated to the Regional and Global Airside Safety Managers. If agreement still cannot be finalised, the matter will be escalated to the Regional and Global Airside Heads. Their decision will be final.

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2a.6 Process Flow

Figure 1 summarises the process flow within IQSMS.



Figure 1: IQSMS Process Flow

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2a.7 Reporting and Follow-Up Business Rules for Specific Occurrence Types

2a.7.1 Loading Errors

A loading error is defined as the difference between the reported and actual loaded state of the aircraft (note: reported means documented in the load plan (LIR)).

This refers to discrepancies between the load plan (LIR), ULD tag(s), and/or position(s), which are either caused by the loading team or where the loading team failed to identify the discrepancy as part of their normal tasks.

Examples include but are not limited to:

- Cargo loaded in an incorrect position
- Cargo shown on load plan (LIR) but not on board the aircraft
- Cargo on board the aircraft but not shown load plan (LIR)
- FAK discrepancies
- Cargo loaded with incorrect weight (i.e. difference between ULD tag and load plan (LIR), which should have been identified by the ramp team during ULD checks)

Any scenario whereby the loading team cannot reasonably detect the discrepancy prior to departure is not considered a loading error (see exclusions below).

Since loading errors have the ability to result in catastrophic consequences, all loading error reports will be opened up for Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Actions within IQSMS.

Process flow in IQSMS:

- During the validation and report approval phase the Regional Airside System Administrator will determine whether the loading error was within LMC limits (as per AGOM Aircraft Technical Specifications). The result will be entered in the “Comment for Responsible” field to inform the Responsible(s)
- All loading errors will be opened up for Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Actions
- To determine the severity of the loading error and whether the GOALS application was in use, additional actions will be required. These will be specified in the “Comments for Responsible” field as follows:
    - SABLE Simulation to determine whether the aircraft was in trim (only applicable to loading errors above LMC limits)
    - Determination whether GOALS was used, and if so, whether it was used correctly as per procedure (applicable to all loading errors)

Final Classification:

- Loading Error – within LMC limit
- Loading error – exceeding LMC limit
- Loading error – aircraft out of trim

SPI Impact:

- All confirmed loading errors will be taken into account for the SPI Calculation

Exclusions:

Any scenario whereby the loading team cannot reasonably detect the discrepancy prior to departure is not considered a loading error and will not count towards the Loading Error SPI.

The following scenarios are not considered loading errors:

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• Weight differences resulting from incorrect scaling/weighing activities or procedure non-compliances in the warehouse that are not detectable during standard loading activities.
For instance, the actual weight of a ULD is 3,300kgs. During scaling, ULD tag preparation, and system updates, the weight was incorrectly indicated as 3,000kgs (300 kgs difference to actual weight). As a result, the ULD tag and load plan (LIR) show 3,000 kgs, and therefore, it is typically not possible for the loading team on the ramp to identify the discrepancy.

Weight differences resulting from incorrect scaling/weighing activities or procedure non-compliances in the warehouse will be classified as “scaling / weight discrepancy”. Since weight differences do have an impact on Weight & Balance, they will be investigated if the discrepancy is above the LMC allowance of the concerned aircraft. A SABLE simulation shall be conducted to determine whether the aircraft was in trim.

- Load control issues. Examples include but are not limited to:
  - Discrepancies between load sheet and actual state of the aircraft, such as for instance:
    - Incorrect number of passengers
    - Incorrect fuel weight
  - Load planning issues that cannot be determined by the ramp team during normal loading activities:
    - Assignment of DG to an incorrect position, i.e. a position that is not allowed as per AGOM Aircraft Technical Specifications
    - Segregation rules not followed

Load control issues will be classified as “load control” events. Since they do have an impact on Weight & Balance and/or the safety of the aircraft, they will be opened up for investigation. For investigations of occurrences involving DG, the business rules outlined in section **2a.7.5 - Dangerous Goods Occurrences** apply.

2a.7.2 Aircraft Damages

Any aircraft damage must be verified with the engineer/flight crew to confirm whether it is a new damage. If the damage is confirmed as being new, it must be recorded in the aircraft tech log by the engineer/flight crew. An IQSMS report shall be made by the local DHL Employee. The tech log entry number must be recorded in IQSMS.

Aircraft damage reports will be investigated when a report was made regarding a witnessed damage event or where fresh damage is evident (i.e. “found”). Clearly historical damage will not be investigated.

Process flow in IQSMS:

During the validation and report approval phase the Regional Airside System Administrator will determine whether the aircraft damage was indeed new based on the information provided in the aircraft damage reporting form. The result will be entered in the “Comment for Responsible” field to inform the Responsible(s)

- Aircraft damages will be opened up for Root Cause Analysis and Corrective actions based on the business rules defined below
- To determine the severity of an aircraft damage, additional actions might be required. These will be specified in the “Comments for Responsible” field as follows:
  - Tech log entry is to be gathered. Note: If a local station has no access to the required documentation, it is the responsibility of the Regional Airside Team to support the station and to contact the concerned airline

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- Assignment of Accountabilities:
    - For any damage that happened at a certain location, the location where the damage occurred will be accountable and responsible to complete all follow-up actions
    - For any damage that was found on arrival, the previous station will be held accountable and will be responsible to complete all follow-up actions. Accountability remains with the previous station unless proven otherwise

Business Rules, Final Classification, SPI Impact:

- Old Aircraft Damage (engineer/crew confirmed that it is not a new damage)
    - Aircraft Damages that were reported in the past will be closed upon receipt
        - Final classification: No Event
        - SPI Impact: None
    - Aircraft Damages that were not reported in the past will be closed upon receipt
        - Final classification: Old Aircraft Damage – No SPI Impact / Accountable Station: Undetermined
        - SPI Impact: None
- Aircraft Damages Interior:
    - Negligible aircraft damages (e.g. inner lining scratches), where no repair was required and no tech log entry exists will be closed upon receipt:
        - Final Classification: Aircraft Damage Negligible – No SPI Impact
        - SPI Impact: None.
    - Aircraft damage that required a repair and where a tech log entry exists will be opened up for Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Actions
        - Final Classification: Aircraft Damage
        - SPI Impact: Yes
- Aircraft Damages Exterior / Door Area:
    - All Aircraft Damages on the exterior / door area will be opened up for Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Actions regardless of severity since any damage to these areas has the potential to cause structural damage, even if not visible:
        - Final Classification: Aircraft Damage (if a repair was required and a tech log entry made)
        - Procedure Non-Compliance (if no repair was required)
        - SPI Impact: Yes for Aircraft Damages

For any report where the aircraft was confirmed AOG by maintenance, the cost of repair and the number of days the aircraft was out of service will need to be identified. It is the responsibility of the Global Airside System Administrator to gather this information with help of the Regional Airside Teams. It is the responsibility of Regional Airside Team to contact the airlines for this information.

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2a.7.3 Locks / Nets Issues

Any lock damage must be verified with the engineer/flight crew to confirm whether it is new damage. If the damage is confirmed as being new, it must be recorded in the aircraft tech log by the engineer/flight crew. An IQSMS report shall be made by the local DHL Employee. The tech log entry number must be recorded in IQSMS.

Business Rules – Lock Damages:

- Locks found broken on arrival will be closed upon receipt (Accountable Station: Undetermined)
- Lock damages during handling will be opened up for Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Actions
- Final Classification: Aircraft Area Damage – Cargo Hold – Locks/Stops/Guides

Business Rules – Lock not raised:

- 1 lock not raised will be closed upon receipt
- >1 locks not raised will be opened for Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Actions
- Final Classification: Locks not raised

2a.7.4 Injuries

Whilst the main reporting tool for injuries is ICARE, all injuries must also be reported in IQSMS for trend monitoring. If available, the ICARE reference number should be mentioned in the description of the IQSMS injury report at the time of reporting. The investigation of injury reports is sitting with the local health and safety teams and shall be conducted in ICARE. Therefore, injury reports will be closed upon receipt in IQSMS. For injury reports with a safety risk category of “High” or “Severe”, the results from the ICARE investigation shall be recorded in IQSMS once it has been finished.

2a.7.5 Dangerous Goods Occurrences

Dangerous Goods Occurrences that have a potential impact on flight safety and fulfil the criteria for Dangerous Goods Exceptions as stipulated in the corresponding chapter of the Dangerous Goods Policy and Standards shall be reported in both RCIR and IQSMS (e.g. hidden DG, DG transported in an incorrect aircraft position). At the time of reporting in IQSMS, the concerned Air Waybill (AWB) number shall be indicated. If available, the RCIR reference number should also be mentioned in the description of the IQSMS occurrence report.

The investigation for DG Occurrences is sitting with the regional/local RCG Groups and shall be conducted in RCIR. Therefore, DG Occurrences will be closed on receipt within IQSMS, with the exception of DG Occurrences whereby a spillage has penetrated the aircraft / ground. These shall be investigated in IQSMS. This is not applicable if the leakage was contained inside the ULD.

It is the responsibility of the Regional Airside Teams to ensure that the respective DG Occurrence has been reported in the main DG Reporting Tool “RCIR”. This does not mean the Regional team are required to do this task, their responsibility is to remind the reporter (or station) has also filed the report in RCIR.

2a.7.6 Build-Up Issues

Quality-related build-up issues will be automatically closed but monitored for trending purposes.

Transfer containers, where a loading team has the opportunity to rectify the poor build-up shall be held accountable if they do not report the non-compliant build-up against the previous station. For lock-stay containers/pallets, the previous station shall be the accountable station.

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